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Abstract. State owned-enterprises (SOEs) influence on CEMAC banking sector has grown 
considerably, with the potential of affecting both the banks and the private sector. This 
study aims to determine the influence of borrower’s nature on the improvement of credit 
risk in CEMAC Sub-region. The methodology used in the study consists of Data 
Envelopment Analysis and Tobit model. A panel dataset of the CEMAC countries from 2004 
to 2014 is constructed from COBAC yearly reports, WDI and The Fraser Institute. The main 
findings from this research suggest that there is a negative and significant link between the 
tendency of CEMAC economies of using more private firms than SOEs investments and 
banking sector efficiency. The negative relationship is explained through weak CEMAC 
institutions.  This study, unlike others studies on banking performances, do not neglect the 
risk’s particular effect. Indeed, the study even determined the risk-efficiency as the 
efficiency of the bank in producing healthy loans.  
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1. Introduction  
hile sub-Saharan frontier countries have recorded significant 
improvements into their per capita growth since 90s, CEMAC 
economies’ performances only have improved moderately (IMF, 
2014). Issues like the weakness of business & governance climate, the 
infrastructure’s gap, the low total factor productivity and the weak 
structural competitiveness among others, seem to be behind this 
underperformance. Leading CEMAC Sub-region’s financial system unable 
to fund the economic development of the Sub-region (Hugon, 2007; Fouda, 
2009). Indeed, the issue of CEMAC banking sector’s inefficiency has been 
considerably highlighted in by the literature; linking inefficiency to 
banking competition, off-balance sheet activities and governance (Bany, 
2015; Ningaye, Madaha, & Nembot, 2014; Eloundou & Befen Djinja, 2016). 
But, these studies neglect the risk’s particular effect on CEMAC banking 
sector performances. Indeed, as argued by Clark (1996), removing risk 
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factors can misguide the results of banks’ efficiency (Clark, 1996). And, the 
risk can be either come from private or state borrowers.  
About that, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) explains that, 
because they are characterized by low bid-ask spreads and high turnovers, 
the developed Government bonds markets contribute to the reduction of 
the market risks. Moreover, they ease the use of government securities as 
collateral, not only for central bank operations, but also between market 
operators (IMF, 2014). About that, in 2013, the Treasuries of Cameroon, of 
Central African Republic and Gabon have started issuing Treasury and 
Government bonds, leading to some liquidity sterilization (CEMAC 
banking sector faces what literature call the excess liquidity paradox2). 
Indeed, as the interest rates are not efficient, the conduct of the monetary 
policy relies on liquidity. But, CEMAC economy is exposed to external 
shocks and its banking system potentially exposed to liquidity 
shocks. Indeed, Governments expenditures depends on oil revenues, which 
in turn affects banks resources and liquidity (IMF, 2014). According to the 
IMF, the lack of suitable instruments for liquidity management, lead banks 
to hold excess reserves during positive liquidity shocks. Thus, the 
inefficient liquidity management from individual banks, the high risk due 
the climate of business, information asymmetry, and the lack of collaterals 
explain the high lending rates. Consequently, the banks inability of 
efficiently assess the risk from borrowers, collapse the credit granted to the 
private sector.  
For instance, in Cameroon, the largest economy of the sub-region, 
banking system vulnerabilities are quite important (IMF, 2018). According 
to an IMF report, there are substantial disparities across Cameroonian 
banks on meeting the prudential ratios. Indeed, 4 banks (around 13% of 
total banks' assets) are in distress; and, 3 of them even have negative 
capital. Together with declining economic activity, this have contributed to 
condense the private sector growth; Indeed, the latter has declined from 14 
to 2% per year between 2014 and 2018 (IMF, 2018). Such a negative 
situation of banks is linked with some State-owned enterprises’ (SOEs)3 
situation. Indeed, the financial situations of SOEs have considerably been 
deteriorated during the recent CEMAC economic recession. 8 of the 12 
biggest State-owned companies have experienced net losses in 2016; 2 of 
them, including SONARA (an oil-refinery Cameroonian SOE), even have 
negative capital. Moreover, SOEs' value added ratio to GDP has declined 
by 29%, driven by CAMTEL (a telecommunication Cameroonian SOE), 
2 The paradox of credit rationing with excess of liquidity is caused by, ceteris paribus, the lack 
of reliable information on borrowers (Avom & Eyeffa Ekomo, 2007). This paradox lead to 
inefficient monetary policy and the inefficiency of banking sector as bank cannot optimally 
allocate funds.  
3 Indeed, SOEs in Cameroon play a key role in the economy despite a share of less than 1% 
of the GDP. SOEs hold monopolies in key sectors of the economy including energy, 
telecommunication, water, and crop farming export (International Monetary Fund, 
Cameroon, 2018). 
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Douala Port, SONARA, and the Cameroon Development Corporation 
(CDC, SOE operating into the agricultural sector)4. 
State owned-enterprises influence on CEMAC banking sector has grown 
considerably. In Cameroon, SOEs' arrears5 have been increasing with the 
potential of affecting both the government and the private sector. From 
IMF reports, SOEs' arrears have almost doubled since 2013, so as to reach 
3.4% of GDP (compared to 1.8% of GDP in the past years); they are driven 
by SONARA (53%) and CAMTEL (13%). Indeed, SONARA is the main 
driver of Cameroonian banking system’s risks. The latter accounts for 65% 
of SOEs' deposits and 62% of SOEs' credits, according to the IMF. And, 
among the 6 banks that have a positive net exposure to SONARA: one bank 
has negative capital, three banks will fail to meet minimum capital 
requirement if SONARA defaults, and two banks will lose around 50 to 
85% of their respective excess capital (IMF, 2018). 
So, are State owned-enterprises in CEMAC Sub-region riskier to fund by 
banks than private enterprises? 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Bank efficiency and credit risk 
Economic literature goes both ways. An older view supports that 
measures taken by authorities and regulators are an important factor in 
improving the positive relationship between capital adequacy, credit risk 
management and bank efficiency (Aggarwal & Jacques, 1998; Jacques & 
Nigro, 1997; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992). The other side of the relationship 
places a special emphasis on the link between banks and their customers. 
Indeed, the quality of the credit granted to customers is crucial for banks 
(Arriaga & Miranda, 2009). Arriaga & Miranda (2009) have explained that 
the risk indicators used by banks, whether qualitative or quantitative, help 
to increase efficiency and reduce non-performing loans. Therefore, 
according to the latter, the problem is whether the risk assessment affects 
the efficiency of the banking sector or whether it affects the customer 
relationship of the bank.  
About that, the economic literature will not last long before providing 
some key element of answer. Indeed, the recent cases of bank failures in 
several countries have been largely attributed to the rise in toxic assets in 
the commercial bank loan portfolio (Onaolapo, 2012). The latter suggest 
that there is a minimal causal link between deposit exposure (credit risk 
substitution management) and bank performance, but with a high 
dependence on operational efficiency parameters. The operational 
efficiency of banks is therefore essential to the proper functioning of the 
economy. Indeed, commercial banks play an important role as financial 
4 This information comes from IMF reports. 
5 According to the IMF, SOEs affect the financial sector through  several channels: (i) directly 
in the form deposits and loans; (ii) through  their fiscal relations with the government 
(taxes, subsidies, and contingent liabilities), and SOEs arrears accumulated towards their 
suppliers. 
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intermediaries for savers and borrowers in an economy. All sectors depend 
on the banking sector for their resilience and development (Odunga, 
Nyangweso, Carter, & Mwarumba, 2013). This operational efficiency of 
banks results from credit risk and capital adequacy measures (Odunga, 
Nyangweso, Carter, & Mwarumba, 2013). One of the direct implications 
will be that the history of a company's performance will influence how a 
company develops itself, in order to streamline their operational strategies. 
Thus, according to Odunga, Nyangweso, Carter, & Mwarumba (2013), 
banks must seek mechanisms in order to improve their risk-based capital 
ratio in the way of improving their efficiency. 
Others researches integrate credit risk in order to monitor bank 
efficiency, by using a by-production approach. They reach the conclusion 
that, although the fact that banks usually exhibited efficiency 
improvements over time, their credit risk performances on the other side 
can go declining (Salim, Arjomandi, & Dakpo, 2017). Considering this, 
Salim, Arjomandi, & Dakpo (2017) suggest that bank’s credit quality can be 
better monitored across Iranian banks. Not very far from Iran, in China, 
Yong & Christos (2018) have investigated the interrelationships among 
banking risk, competition, and efficiency. They have found that Chinese 
commercial banks that record the higher efficiency scores have higher 
credit risk and insolvency risk, but lower liquidity risk and capital risk. 
They argue that greater competition decreases credit risk and insolvency 
risk, but increases liquidity risk. Moreover, credit risk and insolvency risk 
are significantly and positively related to efficiency, while liquidity risk and 
capital risk are significantly and negatively related (Yong & Christos, 2018). 
One could think that risk do not have the same cultural meaning in Middle 
East than in the rest of the world. But, on the other side of the relationship, 
non-performing loan (leading to the increase of the credit risk) is a 
significant predictor of bank’s bankruptcy and, this is a major cause of 
financial weakness all over the world (Koju, Koju, & Wang, 2018). Indeed, 
an increase in loan percentage over the total assets does not automatically 
lead to an increase in non-performing loans. In fact, Koju, Koju, & Wang 
(2018) suggest that in India, high capital requirements and large bank size 
do not reduce default risk, however high profitability and strong income 
diversification policies lower the likelihood of default risk. Thus, the credit 
quality in the banking industry is mostly driven by profitability, banking 
supervision, high credit standards and strong investment strategies (Koju, 
Koju, & Wang, 2018). 
2.1.1. Public vs private firms financing 
The economic literature around the issue of access to finance differences 
between private and public enterprises is not well documented. However, a 
closer issue, the private vs. public financing of companies is sufficiently 
documented. Work in this area can be traced back to Sharp (1951). But long 
before this debate, there is another, much more controversial. Indeed, 
privatization in developing countries is provoking much controversy. A 
debate around this topic is born, and can be summed up by the following 
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question: what is the most important factor for business performance, is it 
competition or private property? This question gives rise to the following 
one: Do state-owned enterprises suffer more from corporate governance 
issues? As Shirley & Walsh (2000) explain, the answers to these questions 
are in favour of corporate private ownership. In most cases, empirical 
research strongly favours private ownership in competitive markets over a 
state-owned counterfactual scenario. In addition, the choice governments 
face is choosing between keeping or privatizing, rather than between 
privatization and optimality (Shirley & Walsh, 2000). Thus, factors like 
quality in the governance of companies can be at the origin of their 
constraints of access to financing.  
In this regard, the table below presents some differences that exist in the 
governance of state-owned enterprises Vs. private enterprises. 
 
Table 1. Some differences in governance between the public and private sectors 
Governance PrivateSector Public Sector 
Regulation Corporations Act Statutory legislation 
Regulator and regulated 
Agents For Shareholders For Public 
Objectives Profit Public good 
Authority Board Government 
Minister/s 
Department 
Board 
Responsibility LegalResponsibility of board Responsibilitydiffused 
Independence Legal Independence of board 
Selection and appointment of  
members 
Ministerial control  
Accountability To shareholders Diffuse 
Reporting Annual Report to shareholders Ministers 
Parliament 
Auditor general 
Agency Heads 
Treasury and Finance 
Source: Author from literature and Armstrong, Jia, &Totikidis (2005). 
 
Differences between state and private enterprises in governance may 
explain some differences in the sources of financing for these firms. Cull & 
Xu (2003) focus on the factors that determine the sources of business 
investment financing, such as retained earnings, bank financing and 
government transfers. They explain that direct government transfers are 
not significantly associated with business profitability. In contrast, bank 
financing is positively related to profitability and reforms. Indeed, the 
reforms that allowed managers to self-select and expose themselves to 
higher risk are positively associated with the acquisition of bank funding 
(Cull & Xu, 2003). Although, private firms are smaller, opaquer in terms of 
information, riskier and more dependent on commercial credit and bank 
loans than state-owned enterprises (Dierkes, Erner, Langer, & Norden, 
2013). 
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Financing private companies receives fewer attention from researchers 
because of lack of data. Huynh, Paligorova, &Petrunia (2013) argue that 
debt ratios are lower for state owned-enterprises (SOEs) and the difference 
is almost entirely due to the greater reliance of private firms on short-term 
debt. The authors explain that debt financing by private and public firms 
responds differently to industry shocks. In periods of positive industrial 
shocks, private firms rely more on long-term debt than public enterprises; 
Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises are making more use of short-term 
debt when conditions in the sector deteriorate (Huynh, Paligorova, & 
Petrunia, 2013). 
There are also differences in the distribution of cash flows between 
private enterprises and public enterprises. According to Drobetz, Janzen, & 
Meier (2016), public enterprises are much more sensitive to investment 
than private companies. A rather rare fact, indeed, the authors suggest that 
the differences in sensitivity between investments and cash flow are not 
due to the stricter financial constraints imposed on public companies 
(Western European Companies). Instead, they suggest an agency-based 
explanation, as they believe that differences in the sensitivity of 
investments to cash flow can only be observed for the unexpected part of 
business cash flows. But, it should be noted that these findings are based on 
low-ownership country companies and liquid equity markets, where 
shareholders have less incentive to monitor executives and instead sell their 
shares in case of dissatisfaction (Drobetz, Janzen, & Meier, 2016). Findings 
difficult to accept in a context like the one of CEMAC economies where 
stock markets are gloomy. Stock market seems to have a significant 
contribution on that debate, but out of African countries. Acharya & Xu 
(2017) explain that SOEs in the external finance industries spend more on 
research and development and generate a better patent portfolio than their 
private counterparts (United States Firms). However, public enterprises in 
industries that depend on internal finance do not show a better innovation 
profile than private companies (Acharya & Xu, 2017).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data envelopment analysis 
Due to the objective of this study, the orientation chosen to measure 
technical efficiency is the output orientation and the intermediation 
approach. About that, economic literature argues that services provided to 
the debtors of financial institutions are the appropriate concept of output in 
the process of decision making (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). 
As CEMAC banks are not working in an optimal scale, the study 
chooses VRS (Variable Return to Scale) instead of CRS (Constant Return to 
Scale). Anyway, as explained by Berger & Humphrey (1997), there is no 
consensus on the preferred method for determining the best-practice 
frontier in order to measure the relative efficiencies.  
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The model is derived in order to determine the efficiency of CEMAC 
Sub-region banks when the objective is to produce Healthy Loans instead 
of just producing Gross Loans. Healthy loans at the time (t) for the bank (i) 
are Gross Loans at the time (t) for the bank (i) minus unrecovered loans for 
the same DMU at the same period.  
Inputs: Deposits, Labour expenses, and General expenses; 
Outputs: Healthy loans. 
The mathematical model to solve is, therefore, the following one: 
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡:  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ( 𝛽𝛽1.𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑦 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆∑(𝛼𝛼1.𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2. 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼3.𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆))𝛽𝛽1.𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑦𝑦 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆
∑(𝛼𝛼1.𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2.𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼3.𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆) ≤ 1:   
 
With 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1; 6] for the CEMAC countries; 
With ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 = 1 : input weight and ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 = 1: output weigh; 
With 𝑆𝑆 ∈ [2004; 2014] for the years, the study's data cover. 
 
3.2. Tobit model 
The specification of the Tobit model is presented as follows:  
 
𝑦𝑦∗𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 = �𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 .𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  
 
Where k is the number of independent variables.  
• Dependent variable:  
Bank Risk-Efficiency scores, computed with the Data Envelopment 
Analysis method. The data used to compute those efficiency scores come 
from COBAC yearly reports.  
• Independent variables:  
The independent variables are constituted of both external determinants 
(Macroeconomic aspect) and internal determinants (Microeconomic aspect) 
of banking performance. The description of those variables is given into the 
following Table 2: 
 
Table 2. Description of independent variables for the Tobit model 
Variable Description 
Micro-Economic Variables 
Gap α The variable Gap α is computed from the data obtained in COBAC yearly reports. The 
objective of this variable is to measure the influence of removing the adverse selection-
based risk that is the ratio Net Loans to Gross loans. Gap α =  1 − (𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄ ) 
Risk β The variable Risk β is made to determine the influence of a moral hazard-based risk on 
banks efficiency. Below is how it is computed: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 β =  𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿⁄  
Banking Sector Size The variable Banking Sector Size measures the number of banks operating in each 
CEMAC countries over time. Data are from COBAC yearly reports. 
Equity to Asset Ratio The variable is computed from COBAC annuals report as the ratio of aggregated bank 
equity to the total balance sheet. 
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Macro-Economic Variables 
Public Credit Registries Public Credit Registries are a measure of information asymmetry on financial markets. 
The study uses public instead of private credit bureaus as there is no private credit 
bureau in CEMAC up to 2017. Another reason is as on (Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 
2007): public credit bureaus is a feature of French civil law countries. 
Interest rate As lending interest rates were not available over the period of study for the selected 
countries, the study chooses Deposit Interest rate to measure the influence of interest 
rates. Deposit interest rate is as defined on WDI: the rate paid by commercial or similar 
banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
The index measures the degree of economic freedom of each country. It focuses on five 
key aspects of the economic environment over which governments typically exercise 
policy control: the size of government; the legal system and security of property Rights; 
the sound money; the freedom to trade internationally; and the regulation. The higher 
the value of the index, the higher the economic freedom and the lower the burden of 
institutions. This variable is useful to control the influence of institutions, and indirectly 
the influence of information asymmetry. The variable comes from The Fraser Institute. 
Legal System & 
Property Rights 
This variable enables to determine whether or not the ability of government to secure 
legal system can influence the performances of banks (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). In such a context, bank may easily recover they unpaid loans. 
According to the methodology use by The Fraser Institute, security of property rights, 
protected by the rule of law, provides the foundation for both economic freedom and 
the efficient operation of markets. 
State ownership of 
banks 
The variable provides evidence on the extent to which the banking industry is privately 
owned. According to Iannota, Nocera & Sironi (2007), public banks are less efficient 
than private ones.  
Private sector credit 
controls 
The variable reflects the conditions in the domestic credit market. The greater the value 
of the index, the lower the presence of state regulations over the private sector credit 
market. The variable comes from The Fraser Institute Database.  
Interest rate controls The variable reflects the conditions in the domestic credit market. The greater the value 
of the index, the lower the presence of state regulations over the private sector credit 
market. The variable comes from The Fraser Institute Database. 
Variables for Borrower’s nature  
Self-employment Self-employment is a relatively practical measure when it comes to measuring 
entrepreneurship in SSA countries. The lack of data6 imposes to exclude the use of 
indicators such as those from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor or Global 
Entrepreneurship Development Institute. The choice of this variable is inspired from 
Nyström (2008), who uses it to investigate the institutional determinants of 
entrepreneurship OECD countries. The variable comes from the WDI. 
Female Self-
employment  
The female self-employment is the share of female self-employment over the total 
female employment. Indeed, self-employed is defined as: the workers who are working 
on their own account, with a several partners or cooperative. Variable extracted from 
the WDI. 
Male Self-employment The male self-employment is the percentage of male self-employed over the total male 
employed. The data also come from the WDI.  
Gender The variable Gender is the difference between male self-employment and female 
employment. 
Government enterprises  The variable comes from The Fraser Institute Database. It measures the extent to which 
countries use private investment and firms rather than government investment and 
enterprises. The idea is that, state-owned enterprises play by rules that are different 
from those to which private enterprises are exposed. The variable increases when 
countries use more of private firms than government investments or state-owned firms.  
Source: Author. 
 
From the above table, macroeconomic variables data come from the 
database of World Development Indicators (WDI), and The Fraser Institute, 
2018 last update. 
6 The data are not available over time when it comes to African countries. In addition, not all 
the CEMAC countries are represented over each indicator in most databases.  
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3.3. Data 
The data cover 6 CEMAC countries (Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea & Chad) and comes from 
COBAC7, yearly reports from 2004 to 2014, The Fraser Institute database 
and the World Development Indicator database (WDI)8. 
DEA model variables come from aggregate countries’ banking sector 
financial statements. As of December 31, 2014, the CEMAC banking system 
has 50 operating banks: 13 in Cameroon, 4 in Central African Republic, 10 
in Congo, 10 in Gabon, 5 in Equatorial Guinea and 8 in Chad (COBAC, 
2014). 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. CEMAC banking sectors need state-owned enterprises to 
improve their risk-efficiency 
An unexpected result! This study revealed the existence of a negative 
and significant link between the strong absence of state-owned enterprises 
and the level of risk-efficiency of the CEMAC banking sectors. The variable 
is labelled “Government enterprises” and measures the extent to which 
CEMAC countries use private investment and firms rather than 
government investment and enterprises. An institutional variable that 
increases when the countries use more of private firms than government 
investments or state-owned firms. The results are presented in the Table 3 
below:  
 
Table 3. Results of Tobit model estimation for bank risk-efficiency 
Bank risk-efficiency 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       Self-employment 0,0066*** 0,001 4,99 0,000 0,004 0,009 
Gap α 0,4824 0,351 1,38 0,169 -0,205 1,170 
Risk β -2,3861** 1,050 -2,27 0,023 -4,444 -0,328 
Equity to Asset ratio 2,1951*** 0,459 4,78 0,000 1,296 3,095 
Public credit registry 0,0093*** 0,001 6,6 0,000 0,007 0,012 
Economic Freedom Index 0,2488*** 0,087 2,85 0,004 0,078 0,420 
Government enterprises  -0,0285*** 0,010 -2,92 0,004 -0,048 -0,009 
Legal System & Property Rights 0,0319 0,033 0,96 0,337 -0,033 0,097 
State ownership of banks 0,0173 0,018 0,96 0,339 -0,018 0,053 
Private sector credit controls -0,0122 0,008 -1,56 0,119 -0,028 0,003 
Interest rate controls 0,0274 0,030 0,92 0,356 -0,031 0,086 
_cons -1,4459*** 0,392 -3,69 0,000 -2,213 -0,678 
       /sigma_u 9,7E-07 898,71 0 1,000 -1761,4 1761,4 
/sigma_e 8,0E-02*** 0,013 6 0,000 0,054 0,106 
       rho 1,5E-10 0,272 0 1 
Wald chi2(11) = 209,63  
Log likelihood =   59,635  
Prob > chi2 = 0,000     
Source: Author from Stata software 
7 Banking Commission of Central Africa. 
8 Depending on the availability of the data. 
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The reasons that may explain this result are not exhaustive. The reasons 
that may explain this result are not exhaustive. The main one is this: the 
weak institutional context marked by the prevalence of information 
asymmetry between private companies and banks makes the state-owned 
companies much more secure to finance. Indeed, the majority of enterprises 
in the CEMAC Sub-region are informal and operate in an environment 
where information asymmetry is high. It is therefore more profitable and 
less risky for banks to lend to the state than to private companies. 
Moreover, it is known that states rarely go bankrupt. Indeed, about 
public financing, the risk-bearing is transferred to the tax-payer (Sharp, 
1951). Lending to the state or to its companies would therefore reduce the 
risk of having unpaid debts. This would help increase the risk-efficiency of 
banks, and, not having the opportunity to lend to the state would represent 
a shortfall for the banks. This is why the strong presence of state-owned 
enterprises improve the risk-efficiency of CEMAC banks.  
Why to encourage the presence of state enterprises in the credit market 
when the majority of the literature is opposed to? In this regard, Keynes 
speaks of the possibility of eviction effect following a strong presence of 
state investments. He explains that private businesses may lack funding 
due to eviction. As response, in the CEMAC sub-region, companies are 
already short of funding and yet the banks are in excess of liquidity (Avom 
& Eyeffa Ekomo, 2007). In addition, the context of sub-Saharan African 
countries is a context in which the asymmetry of information creates 
distortions in the markets, as economic theory explains for the whole 
markets (Akerlof, 1970). 
Therefore, this study finding does not encourage the presence of state’s 
owned enterprises in the whole world, in Europe or America, but this 
study finding does encourage the presence of state’s owned enterprises in 
CEMAC sub-region. Indeed, State investment are still extremely needed in 
CEMAC. About that, a report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
states that like in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the infrastructure gap in the 
CEMAC Sub-region remains large.  From the World Bank’s Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic estimates, USD 93 billion of spending 
per year in public infrastructure was needed from 2005 to 2015 for sub-
Saharan Africa to fill its infrastructure gap. In most of CEMAC Sub-region, 
even basic infrastructure needs remain unmet according to the IMF. 
Moreover, around USD 6 billion per year till 2025 would be needed to meet 
basic infrastructure requirements in CEMAC countries (IMF, 2014).  
 
4.2. Robustness of the relationship 
Even by controlling the effect of our variables of interest by multiple 
other variables used in the literature, the initial hypothesis is still 
confirmed. That is the case of the banking sector size and the level of 
interest rate. Including CEMAC banking sectors’ sizes do not remove the 
significance of Government enterprises’ influence on banking risk-
efficiency. Indeed, the results presented in the above table are closed to the 
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economic though suggesting that the size of the banking sector has a 
positive impact on performance (Short, 1979). This study shows that 
CEMAC banking sector size has a positive and significant influence on 
CEMAC banking sector efficiency. This, without hampering the link 
between the nature of borrowers and the bank risk-efficiency. 
 
Table 4. Robustness of the results of Tobit model estimation for bank risk-efficiency 
Bank risk-efficiency   
 Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Self-employment 0,0040*** 0,001 0,007       
Female Self-employment   0,0034*** 0,002 0,023    
Male Self-employment      0,0042*** 0,001 0,003 
Gap α 1,1644*** 0,381 0,002 1,1993*** 0,395 0,002 1,2015*** 0,365 0,001 
Risk β -3,5674*** 1,020 0,000 -3,5205*** 1,039 0,001 -3,5917*** 1,006 0,000 
Equity to Asset ratio 2,4495*** 0,446 0,000 2,5489*** 0,463 0,000 2,3011*** 0,438 0,000 
Public credit registry 0,0076*** 0,001 0,000 0,0075*** 0,001 0,000 0,0073*** 0,001 0,000 
Economic Freedom Index 0,1435* 0,086 0,094 0,1646* 0,087 0,058 0,1190 0,086 0,164 
Government enterprises  -0,0200** 0,009 0,033 -0,0213** 0,010 0,027 -0,0183* 0,009 0,050 
Legal System & Property Rights 0,0052 0,033 0,873 -0,0059 0,033 0,857 0,0091 0,032 0,773 
State ownership of banks 0,0057 0,017 0,737 0,0034 0,017 0,846 0,0051 0,016 0,755 
Private sector credit controls -0,0164** 0,007 0,024 -0,0202*** 0,007 0,005 -0,0124 0,008 0,100 
Interest rate controls 0,0106 0,028 0,701 0,0105 0,028 0,708 0,0107 0,027 0,693 
Interest Rate -0,0464** 0,019 0,014 -0,0450** 0,020 0,022 -0,0502*** 0,018 0,006 
Size of banking sector 0,0210** 0,008 0,011 0,0230*** 0,008 0,006 0,0207** 0,008 0,010 
_cons -0,4750 0,462 0,304 -0,5318 0,489 0,277 -0,3491 0,441 0,429 
          /sigma_u 0,0000 97,480 1,000 0,0000 48,509 1,000 0,0000 473,296 1,000 
/sigma_e 0,0730*** 0,012 0,000 0,0744*** 0,012 0,000 0,0720*** 0,012 0,000 
          rho 0,0000 0,272 0,0000 0,272 0,0000 0,272 
Wald chi2(11) = 263,9 252,22 272,85 
Log likelihood =   64,690001 63,678773 65,438995 
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Source: Author from Stata software 
 
It's the same for the interest rate control. Indeed, the economic literature 
suggests that in some countries, interest rates negatively affect the 
profitability of banks (Afzal, Raja, Imran, & Saima, 2018). This is also the 
case of this study for CEMAC countries. An influence that, like the 
previous one, is not detrimental to the link between the nature of the 
borrower and the efficiency of the banking system in CEMAC Sub-region. 
The fact that the gender difference in entrepreneurship does not affect 
credit risk management does not mean that entrepreneurship does not 
affect credit risk management. The self-employment variable shows it 
enough. Indeed, the variable has a positive and significant influence on 
banking risk-efficiency. Moreover, an environment marked by the presence 
of female entrepreneurs improves efficiency in credit risk management; It is 
the same for an environment where there is male entrepreneurship. 
Although the effect of male entrepreneurship seems to be slightly higher 
than female, as might be expected from a part of the theory (Loscocco & 
Robinson, 1991), there is no significant gender gap in the efficient 
management of credit risk in CEMAC on the period of study. As Male 
entrepreneurship, female's entrepreneurship does contribute to improve 
the efficient management of credit risk in CEMAC. Therefore, women 
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entrepreneurs should not have their credit application rejected because of 
their gender. 
 
5. Conclusion 
State owned-enterprises influence on CEMAC banking sector has grown 
considerably. In some countries of the Sub-region, SOEs' arrears have been 
increasing with the potential of affecting both the government and the 
private sector. SONARA, one of the biggest SOE of the biggest Economy of 
the Sub-Region is the main driver of the latter’s banking system risks. 
Among the 6 banks that have a positive net exposure to SONARA: one 
bank has negative capital, three banks will fail to meet minimum capital 
requirement if SONARA defaults, and two banks will lose around 50 to 
85% of their respective excess capital. This is one of the two factors that 
motivate the investigation of the influence of some borrower’s nature on 
the efficient management of credit risk in CEMAC Sub-region. 
The study focuses itself on 2 types of borrowers’ nature influence on 
banking risk-efficiency management:The public borrower (through  the 
prevalence of State-owned enterprises and investments) and private 
borrower (through  private entrepreneurship).  
The methodology used in the study consists of Data Envelopment 
Analysis and Tobit model. On the first hand, the DEA method is used to 
compute the risk-efficiency scores of CEMAC banking sectors. The data are 
on a panel basis: The overall 6 CEMAC countries and from 2004 to 2014, 
depending on the availability of the data source. Indeed, they are 
constituted from end of year’s COBAC reports. On the other hand, the 
Tobit model is used to find the influence of borrowers’ nature on bank risk-
efficiency through  the linear regression model with panel-level random 
effects. The data comes from WDI and The Fraser Institute.  
The main findings from this research suggest that there is a negative and 
significant link between the tendency of CEMAC economies of using more 
private firms than SOEs or investments and banking sector efficiency. 
Therefore, the nature of the borrower as private or public firm matters.  
But, the negative sign of the influence is quite unusual. The reasons 
behind this can be found into the institutional environment and the state of 
public infrastructures. Indeed, the weak institutional context marked by the 
prevalence of information asymmetry between private companies and 
banks makes the state-owned companies much more secure to finance. 
Moreover, the majority of enterprises in the CEMAC Sub-region are 
informal and operate in an environment where information asymmetry is 
high. It is therefore more profitable and less risky for banks to lend to the 
state than to private companies. Lending to the state (buying state’s bonds 
and others) or to its firms would therefore reduce the risk of having unpaid 
debts. This would help increase the risk-efficiency of banks, and, not 
having the opportunity to lend to the state would represent a shortfall for 
the banks. This is why the strong presence of state-owned enterprises 
improve the risk-efficiency of CEMAC banks. Therefore, this study finding 
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does not encourage the presence of state’s owned enterprises in the whole 
world, in Europe or America, but this study finding does encourage the 
presence of state’s owned enterprises in CEMAC sub-region where there is 
still a huge need of infrastructures. 
The study recommends to CEMAC authorities to harmonize credit 
policies such as reserve requirements across the Sub-region. Indeed, as 
suggested by IMF, harmonizing the reserves requirements may definitely 
lead to progress in the regional money market growth, and the ability of 
the BEAC to effectively manage the overall liquidity issues in the sub-
region. Another recommendation is to encourage CEMAC government 
bond issues to finance infrastructure projects. Direct loans to SOEs must be 
carefully monitored. Indeed, even if they are more profitable and less risky, 
an exogenous shock could cause considerable damage to the banking 
system. 
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